Historians cannot resist violence.* Not simply because of a voyeuristic interest in the dramatically lethal, but also because many of the most vexing questions about the writing of history converge in the crucible of violent events. Historians are attracted to the subject because they hope that it might tell them something about the fundamental problems in their discipline: questions about causality, agency, narrative, and contingency; about the readability of the past and the conclusions that one can draw about complex social phenomena from fragmentary and often one-sided bits of evidence. Inevitably, however, some historians who write about violence will find their work taken up in broader public debates, and these discussions can take them far from the libraries, archives, and classrooms where they are most comfortable. In this way, historians are ushered, some more willingly than others, into turbulent public forums where their status and claims for expertise make them both sources of legitimation and targets of attack. Regardless of the success of historians in addressing the questions raised by violence, the nature of their efforts, and their varying claims for objectivity or completeness, make them irresistible reference points for others who have a different axe to grind. Historians cannot resist violence, but others who speak of violence cannot resist historians, either.
phases in this discussion can be discerned. In the early to mid-1990s, many of the relevant archives from this period remained closed, and public discussions of colonial violence seemed to be driven largely by non-historians and contingent circumstances. Since those years, however, more of the archives have become available and academic historians have entered the public discussion in larger numbers. Both before and after the opening of the archives, however, it was less the question of colonial violence itself that commanded the attention of both the public and researchers, than the history of particular violent events. Three events in particular served to focus public attention in France on the question of colonial violence: the massacres at Sétif and Guelma in the eastern Algerian department of Constantine in May 1945; the deaths of Algerian protesters at the hands of Paris police in October 1961; and finally the police killings of protesters at the Charonne metro station in the capital during a demonstration organized by the Communist Party and trade union organizations in February 1962.
The afterlife of these three events share a similar trajectory: initially forgotten by the wider public, their respective memories survived in the ensuing decades because of their significance for particular groups in the polity. It is only in recent years that they have come to be seen as connected in important ways. The massacres of Sétif and Guelma remained largely unknown in France, but in Algeria they were memorialized in the strongly nationalist historiography that focused on the events leading to independence in 1962. The fact that the victims of police violence at Charonne in 1962 were members of the Communist Party, meanwhile, meant that their memory was strongly associated with the commemorative practices of the French Left in 1960s and 1970s. The Algerian victims of police violence in October 1961, on the other hand, had no powerful organizations to represent them in the public sphere, and their memory survived largely in the minds of direct participants until the 1980s and 1990s, when a series of coincidences renewed public interest in the disputed events of October 1961.
It was the trial of Maurice Papon in 1997-1998 for crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War that brought wide attention to police violence against Algerians in Paris in 1961, because in addition to being responsible for the deportation of 1500 Jews from Bordeaux during the German occupation, Papon had also been Prefect of Police in Paris between 1958 and 1967. During Papon's trial, author Jean-Luc Einaudi testified that police acting under Papon's authority had murdered dozens of Algerians (who were, of course, of French nationality) in Paris on 17 October 1961 during a demonstration in favor of Algerian independence. 1 Einaudi's testimony received wide coverage and Papon sued him for libel for maintaining the accusations in print. The tactic backfired, however, when the court ruled that Einaudi was within his rights to use the term "massacre" to refer to the killings of demonstrators by the police. 2 The ongoing controversy highlighted the difficulty that historians and other investigators had in accessing police and military archives related to the Algerian war, and Einaudi's efforts helped bring pressure on the archival administration to open to public scrutiny documents relating to the colonial period. 3 In recent years, a new generation of scholars completed the first dissertations using these archives, and their work ushered in the second stage in the historical reconsideration of colonial violence. The public defense in December 2000 of Raphaëlle Branche's thesis on torture and the French military during the Algerian war was an event notable enough to be written up in the French press, and many voices were quick to express the hope that this new scholarly work marked the beginning of a more systematic and measured discussion. 4 Such hopes proved premature, however, as the near simultaneous publication of two autobiographies-one by an Algerian woman tortured by the French military during the Algerian war, and another by a self-confessed torturer and murderer from the French army-kept the ensuing controversy on the front pages of the daily press, but did not necessarily encourage the kind of scholarly discussion ostensibly favored by historians.
5 Sylvie Thénault's important book on French magistrates, law, and the courts during the Algerian war (2001), for example, played little role in the public debate, perhaps because it did not lend itself to the kind of sensational reception that greeted Raphaëlle Branche's work. Yet, arguably, Thénault had done just as much to illuminate the ways that key institutions of the French republic were shaped by the emergency situation confronting the government during the Algerian war. 6 Instead of a calm and measured discussion about the broad history of French colonialism and the place of violence within this history, a flurry of books on specific and sensational violent events has come out in recent years, including two books by Jean-Paul Brunet on police violence in Paris in 1961 and 1962 (published in 1999 and 2003 respectively); a further book by Linda Amiri on violence between the police in Paris and Algerian nationalists during roughly the same period (2004); a co-written volume by Jim House and Neil MacMaster on the same subject (2006); and Alain Dewerpe's historical anthropology of the February 1962 murder of demonstrators by police at the Charonne metro station. 7 Meanwhile, historians Annie ReyGoldzeiguer and Jean-Louis Planche both published books on the 1945 massacres in Sétif and Guelma. 8 New works on related subjects continue to appear with some frequency, but the discussion continues to be dominated by historians from France, Britain, and the United States, and it has been more difficult for scholars working in North African universities to gain the same kind of attention or support for their research. 9 Inevitably, this outpouring of scholarship and its reception have been shaped by larger discussions about the relevance of the colonial past to France's contemporary social and political situation. This is especially true of works dealing with the history of French Algeria and the war of Algerian independence. Each of the above books is about a moment of violence that, by the 1990s, had achieved a kind of iconic status because of their place in bitter pub-lic debates. Even before these books were published, "Sétif," "17 October 1961," and "Charonne" had been so frequently evoked in both France and Algeria by politicians and commentators across the political spectrum that their names had become a kind a shorthand for evoking the violence of the colonial period, and their anniversaries have become opportunities for various forms of ritualized public commemoration, as well as expressions of rancor and regret. The resonance of these events, and the dates they evoke, is demonstrated clearly by the titles inevitably chosen by these authors (or their publishers), titles which depend on the instant recognition of the drama that they contain: 10 In each case, the publishers seized upon the opportunity of exploiting the sensationalist atmosphere surrounding these events in the public imagination. This is unfortunate, because in their own way-and with varying degrees of success-each of these books attempts to move beyond the hyperbolic claims and bitter accusations that have so often characterized public debate about these events and their significance.
It is worth asking why the 1945 massacres in Sétif and Guelma have emerged alongside the police violence in Paris in 1961-1962 as the obligatory points of reference for public discussions of France's colonial past. There are, of course, other equally horrific events to choose from. Part of the answer must arise from the way that these two moments bracket the crucial period of decolonization, the years from 1945 to 1962. The brutal French repression of a perceived insurrection in the region around Sétif and Guelma in May 1945 has often been portrayed as the true beginning of the war for Algerian independence. 11 The violence in Paris in 1961-1962, on the other hand, has become the indisputable illustration of what ultimately resulted from France's misguided efforts to keep Algeria French: a nation divided against itself, on the verge of civil war, with members of the military contemplating a coup d'état, and a desperate state defending itself by unleashing the murderous violence that had long been routine in colonial spaces within the heart of the French capital itself.
The fact that present-day discussions focus so relentlessly on the violence associated with decolonization, rather than, say, the violence of conquest in the nineteenth century, suggests that what remains disturbing to the wider public is less the fact of violence itself, than the circumstances that connect it to the loss of colonial power and authority in the mid-twentieth century. For residents of metropolitan France, nowhere was this loss more traumatic than in Algeria. A significant number of people are alive today who experienced and remember these events, including both former Algerian colonial subjects and former French-Algerian colons, the pieds-noirs. 12 It is also true that France's current political institutions are much more closely connected to the events and history of decolonization in Algeria than they are to the regimes that embarked on African and Asian conquest in the nineteenth century. The focus on Algeria, however, has produced a blinding glare, distracting observers from other equally horrific events from the same period. The killing of French-African troops in Thiaroye (Senegal) in 1944, and again in Casablanca in 1947, the bombing of Haiphong harbor in 1946, and the massacre of tens of thousands of people in Madagascar in [1947] [1948] , have all received some attention in recent years, but it is Algeria which again and again emerges as the central reference. 13 Algeria's unique place among the list of French colonies stems from two facts: first, it had by far the largest colonial settler population among all the French colonies, and second, for most of the colonial period, Algeria was not a colony at all, but a legal part of France.
14 These facts paradoxically mean that while Algeria can in no way be seen as representative or typical of other French colonies in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, or the Pacific, it simultaneously serves as a kind of archetypal or illustrative example of the "essence" of French colonialism, if such a doubtful thing could be said to exist at all. In this way, for better or worse, French Algeria has become the test case for any general inquiry about the nature of French imperial control. Whether the question is about military conquest, political aspirations, legal structures, definitions of citizenship, or the social and economic consequences of French occupation, it appears that the particular circumstances of French Algeria must always be a part of the answer.
It is important to recognize this fact at the outset, because most of these books, despite their ostensibly narrow focus on the circumstances of one particular event, seek to draw conclusions about French colonialism in general. 15 A central question motivating much of this work is the place of violence within the French colonial order: Was this violence "systemic," a structural and necessary part of colonial control, or was it simply the circumstantial result of various weaknesses and failures on the part of those whose job it was to maintain security in the colonies? The claim that colonialism was a "system" with violence at its center is associated with Jean-Paul Sartre, who wrote in 1956, as the war with the FLN was heating up, that Algeria was "alas, the clearest and most legible example of the colonial system." 16 The logic of this system, its "internal necessity," he wrote, "was bound to lead us exactly where we are now"-that is, to a war with Algerian nationalists. For Sartre, the colonial system in Algeria was organized for the purposes of economic exploitation. Colonial settlers, using force if necessary, employed the former owners of the African landscape as laborers to produce goods cheaply for export to French markets. Such a system could only be maintained by military conquest and a civic order that preserved a strict demarcation between colonial subjects and the privileged class of colonial settlers. Frantz Fanon famously argued in the opening chapter of The Wretched of the Earth that the daily violence of the colonizing power would inevitably be met with the relentless and desperate violence of colonized peoples who could only realize their own humanity by destroying a social order predicated on their debasement. 17 Fanon's arguments about the centrality of violence to the colonial project have been taken up and developed more recently by historians such as Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison and Sidi Mohammed Barkat.
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Roughly speaking, and though they might disagree on many other things, MacMaster, House, Brunet, and Amiri, all writing about police violence in Paris in 1961-1962, tend to side with those who see these violent events as the outcome of a cycle of domination and force that was inherent to the French colonial order. Jean-Louis Planche, on the other hand, writing about the massacres in Sétif and Guelma in 1945, explicitly declares his intention of demonstrating that these killings were not the result of a systematic logic of terror at the heart of French colonialism. Dewerpe, for his part, refuses to connect the killings of demonstrators by the Paris police at Charonne in 1962 to any logic that one might call "colonial" at all, and instead finds its ultimate causes in the internal procedures and tactics of a police bureaucracy charged with maintaining order on the city streets in the face of a defiant public.
With regard to the long history of conquest and resistance in North Africa, the contention that violence lay at the heart of the colonial enterprise is both unremarkable and incontestable. At the same time, however, it is also true that books about particular historical events may not be the best means to answer questions about the systematic nature of this violence. An event, whose "delusive smoke fills the minds of its contemporaries," as Braudel famously framed it, resists systematizing precisely because of its singular nature. 19 Events lend themselves too easily to complex narratives, and thus defy attempts at generalization. Indeed, it is precisely the complex and contingent political context of the massacres in Sétif and Guelma in 1945 that allowed Jean-Louis Planche in his new book to deny that the killings stemmed from any general logic of terror at the heart of French colonialism. He denied, as well, that the massacres were the result of a conspiracy planned ahead of time, and dispelled any lingering tendency to blame officials associated with the Vichy regime for the killings. Instead, Planche argued that the deaths of as many as twenty thousand Algerians in the early summer of 1945 at the hands of French military, police, and private militias were the result of a panicked, even paranoid, preemptive strike against an insurrection that was so feeble and disorganized it hardly deserved the appellation.
Certain facts about the repression in Algeria after 8 May 1945 do not seem to be in dispute. On that day, coinciding with the celebrations of V-E Day in Europe, Algerian nationalists called for demonstrations in many Algerian towns and cities. Members of the clandestine and banned Parti populaire algérien (PPA), led by the imprisoned Messali Hadj, and supporters of Ferhat Abbas's legal but closely watched Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (AML), sought to impress the French authorities with a show of Algerian resolve and unity at a moment when the postwar institutions of the Fourth Republic were being created. 20 The demonstrations were met with police violence in many Algerian cities, but the worst confrontation occurred in Sétif, a medium-sized city in eastern Algeria. On the morning of 8 May, police in Sétif fired on demonstrators carrying flags and banners calling for Algerian independence. In response, enraged demonstrators ran through the town attacking and killing many French settlers. As news of the violence spread throughout the region, spontaneous local revolts occurred over the next four days in several other towns, and the number of settler deaths rose to 103 by 12 May. 21 Given the green light from civilian officials in Paris, local authorities in Algeria embarked upon a brutal repression, in which the army and civilian militias embraced a policy of collective punishment. Entire villages of colonial subjects were held responsible for the violence in Sétif and the surrounding region, and were attacked by heavy artillery, aircraft, and in some cases, naval bombardment. Many thousands of Algerians were killed. In Guelma, a smaller city to the east of Sétif, no settlers were killed on May 8, but sporadic attacks in subsequent days triggered a drastic reaction by civilian militias organized by the Gaullist sub-prefect, André Achiary. According to historian Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, settler vigilantes organized and assisted by local authorities killed between 1,500 and 2,000 Algerians solely in the area around Guelma in the weeks following the demonstrations of 8 May. 22 Historical controversy about the events in eastern Algeria in 1945 is inseparable from the larger debates about the origins and meanings of the war for Algerian independence. The French civilian and military authorities admitted only 1,340 deaths in what they claimed was a justified police action against rebellious nationalists. In Algeria, historians and militants sympathetic to the nationalist movement put forward a number closer to 45,000 deaths. Abdelkader Djeghloul, in his preface to Radouane Ainad Tabet's Le Mouvement du 8 Mai 1945 en Algérie (1985 , argued that the insurrection could be seen both as a direct continuation of rural resistance to colonial rule going back to the nineteenth century, and the opening of a new phase of struggle that would culminate in national independence in 1962. Djeghloul's arguments here echoed those of Mahfoud Kaddache, whose monumental history of the nationalist movement in Algeria, published first in 1980 and in a revised edition in 2003, emphasized the breadth and significance of the national movement in Algeria in May 1945, the insurrectional nature of the uprising, and its ultimate destination in the coming decade: a successful war for independence. 23 In arguing for an elevated number of victims, Planche is challenging not only the French government's far more conservative estimate, but also the evaluations of previous French specialists in North African history, such as Charles-André Julien and his student Charles Ageron, who estimated that between six and eight thousand colonial subjects lost their lives in the 1945 repression. 24 At the same time, however, Planche marks his distance from the historians of Algerian nationalism who see the event as part of a continuous tradition of Algerian resistance to French rule. Planche argues that the nation-alist movement in Algeria in May 1945 was disorganized and uncertain, and that the uprising, such as it was, in no way deserved the term of "insurrection." It certainly did not merit the overwhelming and brutal force that the French authorities brought to bear on the local populations of the department of Constantine during these weeks. Although Planche acknowledges the disruption caused in Algeria by the Second World War, the Vichy period, and the subsequent Allied occupation, he prefers instead to see the crisis of 1945 in terms of a resurgence of the complicated political tensions that existed at the local level in Algerian cities in the 1930s. 25 Planche is on familiar ground here, as the author of a thesis on Algerian politics in the 1930s, and that earlier work's arguments are reprised in the first half of his new book on Sétif. 26 In Planche's account, the powerful interests that controlled Algerian politics following World War I had delegated their power to a center-left coalition, which took the name of "Radicalisme" from the Radical Republican party of the Third Republic. This centrist coalition had managed to maintain a political peace among settler elites and minimized the political divisions among the "Europeans" in Algeria that might have threatened their dominance over the mass of colonial subjects. Four things happened in the interwar period, however, to disturb this coalition: the appearance of a strong and independent communist party, the organization of Muslim elected officials following the post World War I reforms, the emergence of a mass-based Algerian nationalist movement in Algeria itself, and a corresponding new form of right-wing militancy among certain settler circles. Planche argued that a portion of the traditional settler elites in Algeria would have preferred to transfer their allegiance from the Radicals to the new Right in the 1930s, yet such a difficult shift threatened to destabilize the delicate balance within Algerian politics between large and small-scale settler establishments, lower and upper middle classes, urban and rural interests, and "Europeans" and "Muslims." 27 The advent of the Popular Front after 1934-coinciding with a flaring of tension between Muslims and Jews in Constantine-exacerbated these conflicts in Algeria, which experienced a prolonged political crisis lasting until the outbreak of the war five years on. The extreme right-wing in Algeria was galvanized by the Popular Front's leftist coalition, a movement that rallied around principles of equality and republican citizenship in France while expressing opposition to authoritarian regimes elsewhere in Europe. The city of Constantine became a stronghold of François de la Rocque's Croix de feu, and Jacques Doriot's extremist party-the Parti populaire français-developed a strong following in Oran and other towns. Meanwhile, when socialist Léon Blum took power in 1936, he was forced to walk a fine line in his colonial policy, because the goals of the metropolitan supporters of the Popular Front diverged sharply from those of many of their potential allies in Algeria. For the leftist coalition of the Popular Front, the task was to bring Muslim political representatives, such as those organized in 1936 in the Muslim Congress, to support the anti-fascist struggle in Europe. For the participants in the Muslim Congress, however, the goal was to find common ground with the Popular Front in order to advance their own anti-colonial program. To the extent that the Popular Front needed the French empire to remain intact and stable in order to carry through its anti-fascist foreign policy, the politicians in Paris were forced to choose between placating the colonial lobby, and supporting loyalist Muslim elected officials who called for equal political rights for all Algerians. In the end, of course, the Popular Front's Blum-Violette bill satisfied no one. This sincere but modest proposal to grant citizenship rights to 30,000 Muslim Algerians was firmly opposed by Algerian settlers and their political representatives and was never passed by the parliament. The failure of the bill is rightly seen as a turning point in Algerian history, leading former supporters of republican citizenship such as Ferhat Abbas to give up on the Republic, embracing in its stead the goal of national self-determination.
Planche argues that the Popular Front coalition's inability to thread the needle in its Algeria policy gave a great advantage to the defenders of the colonial order. In his view, the French colonial project drew sustenance during these crisis years from the French state's ability to offer two faces simultaneously: first, a liberal, republican face, avowedly assimilationist, at least in its rhetoric, and second, an authoritarian face, pitiless in its willingness to use naked power to defend its interests and eliminate its enemies. These two faces were both emanations of the state, but they came from different branches of the local administration, and they cultivated close relations with different parts of the Franco-Algerian polity. The republican face of the colonial state emanated from the political classes who had close traditional ties with labor and the lower-middle class, and their (failed) solution to the Algerian crisis in the 1930s, was the Blum-Violette bill. The authoritarian face of the colonial state, on the other hand, was much more closely associated with the police and the right-wing leagues that flirted with fascism, as well as the wealthy colonial families that funded them. For this group, the solution to the Algerian crisis lay in a show of force against any challenge to the existing political order.
In Planche's view, then, the brutal repression in 1945 that followed the violence in Sétif had less to do with a real threat posed by Algerian nationalists at that particular moment, than it did with a decision among local elites in Algeria to preemptively attack the potential constituency that existed in Algeria for a challenge to the colonial order. The possibility of such an effort was already present amid the tensions of the 1930s, and the massacres of Sétif and Guelma can thus be seen as a postponed "solution" to the prolonged political crisis endured by Algeria in the decade leading up to the Second World War. Planche's account is unforgiving in its judgments of several actors in this story. He is critical of local members of the Communist Party in eastern Algeria, whose ambition to participate in the postwar order drove them to take the side of colonial interests in 1945, and participate wholeheartedly in the repression. He is critical as well of the moderate Algerian nationalist, Ferhat Abbas, who he blames for misunderstanding the forces at play in the spring of 1945, and for underestimating the danger that awaited his followers when they took up his call to demonstrate. And finally, Planche blames the military and civilian authorities in Paris for being ill-informed of the activities of their subordinates prior to the violence of 1945, and then willing accomplices to a cover-up of their brutality after the fact. Finally, though Planche consistently minimizes the extent to which any member of the Algerian nationalist movement could really be said to be in control of events during this period, his argument does little to dislodge the historical consensus about Sétif and Guelma in 1945 being a turning point in the development of a nationalist consciousness among Algerians.
In spite of Planche's professed rejection of any analysis predicated on the notion of a systemic violence at the heart of colonialism, and his insistence on the singular nature of this complex event, his argument remains compatible in some ways with the work of others who perceive in the history of French Algeria a pernicious logic that produced the worst excesses in the years leading up to decolonization. In particular, Planche's story about the blurring of boundaries between the police functions of civilian authorities, and the military's capacity to use overwhelming force in the colonial situation, resonates with the histories of police violence in Paris in the early 1960s offered by House and MacMaster, Dewerpe, Brunet, and Amiri. Of these works, the co-written volume by House and MacMaster on police violence in Paris against Algerians in 1961, and Dewerpe's magisterial study of the killing of demonstrators by police at the Charonne metro station in 1962, are the most substantial and convincing, though they differ from one another in important ways. Dewerpe's book, the study of a historical anthropologist, displays a remarkable sensitivity to the multi-layered context of human actions in complex historical situations, in particular when he offers his explanation for how the police came to kill their co-citizens at a moment of confusion on the streets of Paris in 1962. House's and MacMaster's book, on the other hand, is particularly strong in filling out the details in a story that was already familiar to historians in its broad outlines, demonstrating how policies of policing and control that were elaborated and refined in colonial spaces in Africa and Asia slowly spread throughout the entire apparatus of government in the Fourth and Fifth Republics. Whereas Planche's book on Sétif emphasized the autonomy of local officials in Algeria, MacMaster's and House's volume on Paris in 1961 places ultimate responsibility on those at the top of the governmental pyramid. In one sense, the target of their criticism is Charles de Gaulle himself, and an important goal of the work is to challenge an older consensus which credits de Gaulle with skillfully navigating a successful path to decolonization after 1958 in the midst of impressive obstacles. Instead, MacMaster and House argue that de Gaulle and his subordinates prolonged the nightmare for both the French and the Algerians by refusing to negotiate with the FLN's provisional govern-ment (GPRA), and by adhering to a repressive policy that targeted all Muslim Algerians indiscriminately as potential enemies of the state. A chief architect of this repressive policy was Maurice Papon, the Prefect of Police in Paris from 1958 to 1967, and the former Prefect of Constantine in Algeria between 1956 and 1958. House and MacMaster devote much energy to dissecting the career of Papon, not only because of his personal responsibility for the murder of Algerians by French police in the fall of 1961, but because they believe that his "career and core ideological beliefs were representative or typical of a whole generation of government ministers, senior civil servants, army commanders, prefects, and politicians." 28 Earlier work on police violence against Algerians in Paris in 1961 has focused almost entirely on one particular event, the demonstration of 17 October, in which it is now generally agreed that the Parisian police killed dozens of Algerian demonstrators, most of them laborers living in shantytowns and rented rooms in the Paris region's most disadvantaged neighborhoods. The strongly dissonant accounts offered by Jean-Luc Einaudi and Brunet in the 1990s were nonetheless alike in keeping a very tight focus on the events of that day and night, when groups of protesters converged on Paris on foot, and on trains and busses, only to be attacked by the police at several points in the city, most notably the Pont de Neuilly, the grands boulevards, and the Latin Quarter. No one will ever know the exact number killed, and most historians have contented themselves with the approximation, "several dozens." No one contests, however, that by the end of the week, more than 14,000 Algerians were being held in improvised detention centers throughout the city, many of them suffering from severe injuries as a result of beatings. 29 Most of the active work of commemoration by various civic action groups has also concentrated on this single day, as if the paroxysm of violence witnessed by Parisians on that particular evening deserved separate, exalted treatment. 30 Indeed, it is a significant contribution of House's and MacMaster's book that they expand the frame of their analysis to include a systematic evaluation of the evidence for a pattern of police violence against Algerian laborers in the Paris region that extended over a period of several months, culminating in September and October, in which they conclude that "well over 120 Algerians were murdered by the police in the Paris region." 31 Whenever earlier commentators sought to establish a broader context for understanding 17 October, they usually framed it in terms of a long-running conflict between the FLN's Fédération de France and the police in metropolitan France. 32 Linda Amiri, Jean-Paul Brunet and Ali Haroun, for example, have emphasized the extent to which the struggle between Algerian nationalists and the police in France was a struggle for the loyalty of the Algerian laboring population-a struggle that the police ultimately lost. In other words, these historians have framed the confrontation as a continuation of the war in Algeria, one initiated by the FLN, as it sought to open a new phase of the conflict by attacking targets in "European" France. House and MacMaster do not min-imize this dimension of the conflict-in fact, their account does much to fill out what we know of the story. Yet unlike previous authors, they do not accept the violence of the police against Algerian laborers in the Paris region as a "natural" or inevitable outcome of the war's extension into mainland France. Instead, they emphasize a different context, an ongoing "crisis" within the police hierarchy resulting from Papon's wholesale importation of a repressive colonial policy from Algeria. Seen in this light, the violence that became visible in Paris on 17 October emerged gradually out of Papon's concerted efforts to undermine the FLN's Fédération de France through a broad series of repressive police measures aiming at the Paris region's entire Algerian population.
The focus on Papon's career provides MacMaster and House with a means of making specific historical connections between the politics of the cold war after 1945 and the earlier history of colonial policies and racial thinking during the period of the Popular Front and Vichy. Papon, along with his patrons René Mayer and Maurice Sabatier, and his subordinates Jean Chapel, Pierre Garat, Pierre Someville, and Pierre-René Gazagne, constituted a core group of functionaries within the French state with experience in Algeria and in many cases under Vichy. With the interesting exception of Mayer, who was himself Jewish, these officials were familiar with the techniques of policing that were used to monitor the Jewish and foreign population during the war years, and they were ready to adapt these procedures to control the movement of Algerian colonial subjects in France under the Fourth and Fifth Republics. 33 MacMaster and House emphasize how this constant circulation between north Africa and the metropole created a cadre of committed functionaries who combined a defense of empire with a fervent anti-communism, a combination that led them at moments of crisis to blur the boundaries between the police and military functions of the state, and to mobilize, within "European" France, techniques of state violence perfected in the colonies. More so than previous authors, House and MacMaster emphasize the importance of Papon's experience in Morocco as a precedent to the strategies later used in Algeria and in Paris against Algerian nationalists: the cordoning off of entire neighborhoods or villages, mass arrests (ratissages), the use of torture, organized beatings, detention centers, special tribunals, and summary executions. Previous work, such as that of Einaudi, emphasized the precedent of Indochina. House and Macmaster demonstrate how widespread these practices were throughout the French imperial sphere in these years, and argue that Papon's appointment as Prefect of Police in Paris marked the moment at which such tactics became thinkable in the metropole for the first time. These practices, they argue, were justified by a fully developed ideological program that combined a model of civilizational conflict with elements of social Darwinism, orientalist conceptions of the "Islamic personality," and a crude behavioralist vision of human nature that led to organized "psychological" warfare against entire populations.
34
It was this program, perfected in Morocco, Indochina, and Algeria, and implemented in Paris by Papon after his appointment as Prefect of Police in March 1958, that eventually led to a severe crisis within the ranks of Paris police between July and October 1961. Some officers, including many representatives of powerful police trade unions, resisted Papon's recourse to what they saw as illegal tactics in the struggle with the FLN. When the FLN resumed attacks on police agents in July 1961, Papon's response was to unleash police terror on the entire Algerian community, a policy that satisfied the most radicalized elements of the force, but which caused the trade union representatives to break with their superiors. The result, argue MacMaster and House, was a prolonged moment of uncertain leadership within the police administration, with Papon taking an increasingly belligerent public posture, even publicly encouraging police violence against Algerians, while also maneuvering behind the scenes to prevent the full story of his tactics from leaking out to the wider public as more members of the administration began to question the wisdom of his policies.
Dewerpe's book on the killings at Charonne metro station in Paris in February 1962 provides a fascinating and instructive counterpoint to House's and MacMaster's closely related book. The deaths of nine communist protesters at the hands of police on 8 February 1962 occurred during a demonstration organized by the Communist Party in tandem with various trade unions and student groups in response to the right-wing extremists of the OAS (Organisation de l'armée secrete) who had detonated a bomb at the residence of André Malraux, the Minister of Culture in Charles de Gaulle's government. Malraux was not present at the time, but the explosion blinded and maimed Delphine Renard, the eight-year old daughter of the building's caretaker. The organizers of the hastily-convened demonstration decided to proceed with their plans even after the police refused permission for the gathering, and the deaths occurred when panicked members of the crowd sought to flee a violent police charge by running down the stairs of a metro station. The nine victims were crushed and asphyxiated in the press of people as enraged police rained debris down on top of them, including the iron gratings that protected the roots of trees planted along the Boulevard Voltaire.
Dewerpe's account is meticulously constructed from available historical sources and numerous interviews with participants. Although he himself is the son of Fanny Dewerpe, one of the victims killed by police on that day, his analysis remains resolutely detached throughout the nearly 900 page work, and his careful argument never resorts to rhetorical indignation or emotional appeal. The book is all the more devastating for its restraint. Dewerpe argues that the violence at Charonne was the direct result of several converging circumstances: a tradition within the French police that created designated units for crowd control trained in the strategic use of violence; post-1945 recruiting policies within the police administration, which encouraged the retention of anti-communist agents and the dismissal of trade unionists; a political climate at the end of the Algerian war in which opponents of the OAS were seen by many within the police as pro-FLN; and finally, an ongoing crisis within the French police as divisions between OAS sympathizers emerged more clearly in opposition to the many trade-unionists within the force. Like House and MacMaster, Dewerpe suggests that Papon's career provides an "exemplary" illustration of the factors contributing to the violence of February 1962, but instead of emphasizing Papon's importation of colonial practices to the metropole, he suggests that Papon was simply the most rigorous proponent of a strategy of policing that had deeper roots within the Republic, and its conception of public order.
Why did the French government in 1962 authorize the repression of a demonstration in favor of Algerian independence at a moment when the government itself was committed to the same cause? The answer, says Dewerpe, lay in the thin margin for maneuver faced by a regime that was fighting simultaneously on three fronts-against the FLN, the OAS, and the communist opposition at home. In his treatment of the demonstration's organizers, Dewerpe emphasizes the disunity on the left, the difficulty various socialist and syndicalist groups encountered as they attempted to find common cause with the Communist Party (PCF) as part of an anti-OAS and anti-fascist front. This difficulty added to the uncertainty on the part of the government, which understood that a certain portion of the left sought a solution to the crisis that included the ouster of de Gaulle, but could not predict the boundaries of the coalition, nor which groups would shape its ultimate objectives and strategies. In the end, Dewerpe suggests that the logic of repression followed from the government's inability to see the demonstration as anything but a communist-inspired movement, and from the Gaullist regime's desire to forestall any attempt by the PCF to take advantage of the negotiations with the FLN and the impending independence accords. Rather than portray the decision to use such murderous violence as the outcome of racial ideologies and colonial practices imported to the metropole, however, Dewerpe concludes this line of argument by suggesting that the potential for massacre is inherent to the monopoly of violence enjoyed by modern states, a possibility at the outside edge of the state's power, rarely activated, but ominously ever-present. 35 It is tempting to make something of the fact that Dewerpe's pessimistic conclusions, given in such general and abstract Weberian terms, emerge from his examination of a police massacre with white European victims, while House's and MacMaster's arguments about colonial practices and racial ideologies come from their research into the deaths of North Africans at the hands of the same police force. What prevents the deaths of North Africans from also achieving universal significance? Why should the deaths at Charonne lead to speculation about the ever-present threat of massacre within the heart of modern states, while the deaths at the Pont de Neuilly, or on the grands boulevards a few months earlier, remain confined within an analysis that focuses on the specificities of a colonial logic that eventually reverberates back to Europe? In no way should these questions be seen as a reproach to any of these authors-I found both of these works to be convincing and important taken on their own terms. I am troubled, however, by an apparent incompatibility between the general conclusions that they draw and the implications of these conclusions for our understanding of state violence in France, whether understood to be "colonial" or otherwise. On the one hand, House's and MacMaster's arguments about the colonial ideologies of officials responsible for the deaths of Algerians in Paris in 1961 lend a compelling dimension to our understanding of the connections between colonial and metropolitan spaces during these years, and make a plausible case for expanding our understanding of "colonial violence" to include events such as the demonstration of October 1961 on the streets of Paris. On the other hand, Dewerpe's equally compelling arguments suggest that there may not be anything distinctive about "colonial" violence at all, whether one sees it occurring in Algeria or Paris, since such massacres remain a latent possibility in all states, waiting only for the right circumstances of crisis to emerge.
As a historian, I find myself initially more comfortable with the position taken by House and MacMaster, if only because they avoid the temptation to make generalizations about all states claiming a monopoly of violence, and restrict themselves to the specifics of their story. I wonder, however, if by focusing so tightly on the personalities and ideologies of individuals such as Papon, who moved so effortlessly from Rabat to Paris to Constantine and back again, House and MacMaster might be overlooking continuities between this history of state violence and earlier examples of French regimes that resorted to massacre in order to legitimate and preserve their authority. Has their focus on the careers of specific individuals allowed them to avoid considering the ways that the institutions of the Republic were shaped by organized violence against other populations who refused to be considered French, a history that includes the Vendée in the 1790s and Brittany in the 1900s, as well as Algeria, West Africa, and Indochina? 36 House's and MacMaster's book rightfully insists that racial ideologies played an important part in the police killings of 1961, but we should not thereby conclude that such racially motivated political violence was not closely related to other episodes of state violence whose exclusions and targets were justified on other grounds.
At the same time, we might also reproach Dewerpe for not fully considering the relationship of these racial ideologies to the events at Charonne (as much as one can fault the author of a nearly 900-page book for leaving anything out). Dewerpe notes that many of the police involved in the violence at Charonne had also participated in the repression of the demonstration of 17 October 1961, but he does not insist on the importance of the connection. 37 Instead, he emphasizes the banality of the violence used by the police at Charonne, arguing that their actions are more noteworthy for being routine and habitual, rather than unusual. "The fact is, the brutality observed during the demonstration of 8 February 1962 was in no way abnormal. One does not see here police practices [comportements policiers] that are unique or exceptional. The style of repression, the type of weapons used, and the forms of brutality were all common ones. Charonne thus brought to a climax, in a unique and revealing moment, the manner in which the French police-and in particular the Parisian police-routinely behaved…" 38 Dewerpe's emphasis on routine police practices allows him to develop a persuasive argument about how a state bureaucracy trained in the application of calibrated violence might eventually intentionally kill its own citizens, but he chooses not to examine the meaning of this violence for either the perpetrators or victims at the moment that these events occurred. Like House and MacMaster, Dewerpe instead explores these contested meanings primarily through his concluding sections on the memory of these events, and he ends his book poignantly with a long meditation on the ways in which historians and commentators have linked the memories of 17 October 1961 and 8 February 1962. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Communist Party ensured that the dead at Charonne would not be forgotten, while the victims of October 1961 faded from view. Since the 1980s, the pendulum swung back in the other direction, as antiracist organizations in France seized on the memory of 1961 as a powerful vehicle for building a constituency for their message of equality and opposition to racial discrimination. For Dewerpe, this waxing and waning of public attention is unfortunate. For too long, he argues, these two events have competed with each other for attention, and for too long, the perceived need to identify with one set of victims over the other has precluded acknowledging both with the same degree of humility and regret. Dewerpe's lack of attention to the role of racial ideologies in the police violence of 1961-1962 might thus be excused, since it is so obviously a part of his commitment to avoid a polarizing emphasis on one or the other. The contested meanings of race remain a part of this history, however, and it is unlikely that Dewerpe's sincere attempt to render equal justice to both Algerian and French victims of state violence will be the last word in this debate. The conclusions of the Mandelkern report were made available to the press in January 1998, with a relatively conservative estimate of the number of victims of police violence. Historians and journalists were initially not permitted to see the documents upon which these cautious conclusions were drawn. Instead, three historians were given permission to see the relevant archives from the Prefect of Police in May 1998: Jean-Paul Brunet, Jean-Marc Berlière, and Denis Peschanski. Einaudi, on the other hand, was denied permission until after Brunet had published his book on the subject, and Berlière and Peschanski do not appear to have taken advantage of the permission to conduct their own research. Mandelkern's relatively conservative judgment on the number of victims of police violence in 1961 was later challenged by a separate official report emanating from the Ministry of Justice, commissioned by Elisabeth Guigou in October 1998 and completed by Jean Geronimi in May 1999.
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